This paper proposes a dynamic Stackelberg repeated game for decentralized Device-to-Device (D2D) communications overlaying cellular communications. The proposed game aims to jointly optimize D2D user behavior via a user-in-the-loop (UIL) approach; and minimize transmit power, while maximizing packet delivery ratio (PDR) for all D2D users. The Stackelberg game architecture consists of a single leader (base station -BS) and multiple followers (D2D users), where the leader selects its satisfaction with the social welfare of the D2D users by considering the reaction of the followers from the charged price it assigns. The followers on the other hand select transmit power so as to guarantee a certain level of quality-of-experience (QoE) for all players. We express D2D user behavior as: (i) low data requirement; (ii) medium data requirement; and (iii) high data requirement. Therefore, each type of data requirement is assigned different utility functions due to the performance demands of D2D users. Both the leader and followers aim to maximize their utility function within the Stackelberg game. We prove that there exists an overall Stackelberg Equilibrium for our proposed game for all players, which is a sub-game perfect equilibrium, as the equilibrium achieved at each stage is independent of the game history. Our simulation results illustrate that once the leader rapidly converges to an optimal outcome with respect to satisfaction, the followers then rapidly converge to a Paretoefficient outcome with respect to transmit power and PDR.
I. INTRODUCTION
Device-to-Device (D2D) communications have been introduced to cellular communications to help take the load off the cellular network, by reducing the demand on the central network operator, i.e., the base station (BS) [1] - [5] . Optimization of D2D communications is important for optimal mode selection, resource utilization, interference management, power control, and spectral efficiency. Recently D2D user behavior has been considered for fifth generation (5G) cellular networks, using the user-in-the-loop (UIL) approach. UIL is a closed loop system with feedback, which allows D2D users to choose what their requirements are and whether they will allow their behavior to be controlled/influenced [6] - [10] , i.e., smart communications.
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NICTA is funded by the Australian Government through the Department of Communications and the Australian Research Council through the ICT Centre of Excellence Program. Game theory is a decision making process, and allows rational players (e.g., cellular and D2D users) to select their action from an action set [11] . During the game, each player aims to maximize their utility with respect to their action, to find an optimal solution and/or equilibrium in the game [11] , [12] . Here we will focus on a non-cooperative game, with no communication between players. There are several types of games which can be used to optimize D2D communications, such as non-cooperative power control games, Stackelberg games, and auction-based games [11] .
In this paper, we propose a dynamic Stackelberg game for resource allocation in distributed D2D communications, with D2D overlay to cellular users. The BS is the Stackelberg leader, where it determines a price to charge the followers, such that it can optimally select its satisfaction of the communication cell. The D2D users are the competing Stackelberg followers accessing the same spectrum, who try to optimally select transmit power while guaranteeing qualityof-service (QoS) and quality-of-experience (QoE), with respect to the satisfaction price set by the BS. Hence, the following contributions are made: 1) Our dynamic Stackelberg repeated non-cooperative game jointly optimizes user behavior at the application layer and transmit power at the physical (PHY) layer, to increase overall system capacity, QoS, and QoE for each D2D user, as well as guaranteeing social welfare across all D2D users. 2) We investigate D2D user behavior with respect to three types of data requirements: (i) low; (ii) medium; (iii) high. Each behavior group is assigned a different utility function which suits the particular behavior and its properties.
3) The performance metric packet delivery ratio (PDR) is used to measure communication priority and reliability for each D2D user. We show the effects of PDR on our proposed game by setting different minimum PDR targets for each level of data requirements, e.g., low data requirement has a minimum target PDR of 0.90, medium data requirement has a minimum target PDR of 0.94, and high data requirement has a minimum target PDR of 0.98. 4) We show that our proposed game overall has a unique Stackelberg Equilibrium, and it is a sub-game perfect equilibrium at each stage in the game which is independent of the game history. The leader, i.e., the BS, and followers, i.e., the D2D users, converge to optimal outcomes. The leader's satisfaction first rapidly converges to an optimal outcome, then the followers arXiv:1603.00104v1 [cs.NI] 1 Mar 2016 rapidly converge to a Pareto-efficient transmit power and PDR outcome. The optimal outcome for the leader in terms of satisfaction helps guarantee social welfare across all D2D users. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we investigate related work to our proposed game. Section III outlines the system model of our proposed game. In Section IV we define our dynamic Stackelberg repeated game, describe the leader's utility function plus the three types of utility functions for the followers, and investigate the cost function assigned to the followers utility function. We prove that there exists a unique Nash Equilibrium for the leader and followers, resulting in a Stackelberg Equilibrium for our proposed game. Simulation results for our proposed game are outlined in Section V, where we compare our game results to three different non-cooperative power control games. Finally, concluding remarks are made in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
D2D communications can be implemented in licensed or unlicensed spectrum. We study D2D communications in licensed spectrum (in-band), i.e. the cellular spectrum [1] , [5] , [13] , [14] . Depending on how D2D and cellular users share the spectrum, D2D communications could introduce two-types of interference within the network; inter-cell interference and intra-cell interference. Inter-cell interference is the interference generated between D2D and cellular users from other cells [1] , [11] , [13] , [15] , where intra-cell interference is the interference generated between cellular and D2D users within each cell [1] , [11] , [13] , [15] . Non-cooperative power control games and other power control methods have been implemented in D2D communications to help minimize transmit power and mitigate interference, while guaranteeing QoS for all users, as in [11] , [16] - [18] . Stackelberg games have been implemented for resource utilization, such as power control, interference management, mode selection, and scheduling, as in [11] , [19] - [23] .
Offloading traffic from the BS provides the following advantages to the network: (i) the BS can accommodate more users within the cell and increase system capacity and throughput [5] , [11] , [24] , [25] ; (ii) increasing spectral efficiency of the network [5] , [11] , [24] , [25] ; (iii) reduced latency for both cellular and D2D users [5] ; (iv) reducing the required power consumption of the BS, cellular users, and D2D users [11] , [16] - [18] , [24] . As a result, the BS will have more resources to allocate to determining the cell layout, user locations within the cell, priority, and type of communications.
The BS can also measure each D2D user's satisfaction within the cell [24] , [26] , in order to satisfy cell requirements. Satisfaction of a D2D user can be measured by guaranteeing either QoS [27] , or QoE [6] . In [24] , a user satisfaction based resource allocation algorithm for D2D communications was established, using an artificial fish swarm approach. From [24] the proposed approach provides improved average system satisfaction and increased system throughput, as the number of D2D pairs is increased. The BS can determine the social welfare of the cell by summing all the D2D users satisfaction [25] , [28] , where social welfare is a socially optimal outcome for particular network users-of-interest [29] , [30] .
User-in-the-loop (UIL) is an approach which can be used to enable, and measure, D2D user satisfaction. UIL aims to aid user's experience by reducing traffic and delay within the network. Within UIL users can choose what their behavior/requirements are, and depending on their chosen behavior incentives or penalties may be charged to users, while ensuring users maintain a certain level of QoE [8] , [9] . Depending on the D2D user's chosen behavior, the incentives provided to the user may consist of postponing their non-urgent message to another time when there is less traffic, or moving to a different location where there is less traffic [7] , [8] . On the other hand, the penalties provided to the user may consist of charging the user a cost, if they did not wish to postpone their message or move to a different location [7] , [8] . Considering user behavior within the network, overall network spectral efficiency can be increased, along with QoE for each D2D user [6] . Jointly optimizing user behavior and resource utilization is an important research problem that needs to be addressed for D2D communications, as outlined in [31] . Such joint optimization, as will be outlined in this paper, can lead to significantly improved user experience and require less user input, while optimizing communication parameters that increase network efficiency.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We implement our proposed game in a single cell for a future fifth generation (5G) cellular network, where D2D communications overlay the cellular network. Future 5G cellular networks will supersede Long Term Evolution -Advanced (LTE-A) cellular networks where some forms of D2D communications can already be deployed. Within the cell there exists one base station (BS), one channel, one cellular user, and N D2D users, {d 1 ,d 2 ,. . . ,d N }, as illustrated in Fig. 1 . This simplified scenario can be applied to a more general case with many cellular and D2D users. For two D2D users to communicate to one another, both users must be within the maximum transmission range, creating a D2D (transmitterreceiver) pair. Within the cell there exists N 2 D2D pairs. As D2D communications is implemented as an overlay to cellular communications, cellular and D2D users transmit in orthogonal spectrum, hence eliminating interference between the particular cellular user and D2D users, as D2D users operate on dedicated spectrum [11] , [13] - [15] . (Importantly, the D2D users can still cause significant radio interference to each other, i.e. non-paired D2D transmitters act as hidden terminals to D2D pairs within the cell). Additionally, here we consider a single cell scenario, so inter-cell interference is not considered.
The cell has been allocated one channel, which is divided into K orthogonal subchannels as in [13] , [14] [18], [20] , [23] , where the BS allocates part of the uplink spectrum from cellular users to D2D users, and the left-over spectrum can be utilized by the cellular user. The D2D users will compete against one another for the spectrum without causing interference to the cellular user due to the overlay scenario. Due to the spectrum allocation by the BS, both users within a D2D pair cannot transmit at the same time, as this would result in large self-interference [32] . To determine which D2D user transmits within the D2D pair, we have assigned D2D users with an odd index to transmit in odd time slots, and D2D users with an even index to transmit in even time slots.
Depending on spectrum allocation by the BS, interference between D2D pairs may be large. The interference received at a D2D receiver, is the sum of the non-paired D2D transmitters sharing the same subchannel. To guarantee QoS to D2D and cellular users, we place a threshold on Signal-to-Interferenceplus-Noise Ratio (SINR), to help ensure signal quality. The SINR at the receiver for the i-th D2D pair using part of the k-th subchannel at time slot t is given by,
where p di,k (t) is transmit power of the i-th D2D user in subchannel k at time t; p dj,k (t) is the interfering transmit power of the j-th D2D user, who is sharing the same subchannel as the i-th D2D user; g (di,di ),k is the channel gain between a D2D pair, di and di , in subchannel k; g (dj,di ),k is the interfering channel gain between the i-th D2D pair receiver and j-th D2D transmitter, in subchannel k; N 0,d is the noise power for D2D users;γ d is the target SINR for D2D users. The SINR for the i-th cellular user using subchannel k at time t is given by,
where p ci,k (t) is transmit power of the i-th cellular user in subchannel k at time t; g (ci,BS),k is the channel gain between the cellular user and the BS, in subchannel k; N 0,c is the noise power for the cellular user;γ c is the target SINR for the cellular user, to ensure signal quality.
A. Performance Metric -Packet Delivery Ratio
The performance metric PDR, is a compressed exponential function of inverse SINR [33] , as follows,
where γ i is the SINR of the i-th user; a c and b c are constants which depend on packet size, type of modulation, and coding scheme. We can rearrange (5) into a simpler form as follows,
where a = −( 1 ac ) bc ; and b = −b c . We use PDR to help determine reliability of a signal and measure communication priority.
According to the 3GPP standards, the modulation schemes employed are QPSK, 16-QAM, and 64-QAM, with a turbo code rate 1/3 [34] . We are able to solve Bit Error Rate (BER) with respect to SINR E b No for the three modulations, with no coding and with coding for the same packet length of 1024 bytes. Due to the turbo code rate 1/3, this introduces a coding gain to the uncoded modulation schemes, which are, 13.75 dB for QPSK, 15.75 dB for 16-QAM, and 17 dB for 64-QAM. Fig. 2 compares simulated PDR results to an approximation of PDR. The PDR approximation, approximates the constants a c and b c by taking the minimum error margin between the simulated PDR and approximated PDR. We see that this approximation result is very close to the simulation. Table I outlines the approximated values for a c and b c , for all three modulations, with the same packet length of 1024 bytes.
IV. DYNAMIC STACKELBERG USER-IN-THE-LOOP GAME
We propose a dynamic Stackelberg user-in-the-loop (S-UIL) repeated game, which is finitely repeated for T times, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , where T < ∞. The S-UIL game consists of a single leader and multiple followers. Where the leader of the game is the BS and the D2D users are the followers, as outlined in Fig. 3 . The BS aims to gain optimal satisfaction within the cell, with respect to the D2D users. Initially, the BS has little satisfaction and knowledge about the cell and the D2D users. Thus, the BS assigns a satisfaction price to the D2D users to gain more information. The satisfaction price assigned to the D2D users, must be reasonable, such that appropriate levels of interference and transmit power are maintained by D2D users. D2D users on the other hand behave selfishly with respect to each other and the BS. The followers of the proposed game have imperfect information, which means that all followers select their action simultaneously. The followers individual strategy is to minimize their transmit power within the transmit power range, p min ≤ p i ≤ p max . When a follower selects it's action, there are two factors which must be considered: the satisfaction price set by the BS; and the aim to maximize their own utility function. Our proposed game is a sequential game, which is evident in Fig. 3 , thus the leader first solves its utility function and assigns a price to the followers, the followers then solve their utility functions and share their measured performance to the BS, such that it can update its satisfaction, for the next iteration in the game.
D2D users must also guarantee QoE by providing users with three types of behavior to choose from, which are outlined as follows,
High Data Requirement.
These three levels of behavior are quite broad and thus address all types of practical applications for D2D users, which include: local voice calls; SMS (Short Message Service); local Leader: Base Station (BS); Action: BS Satisfaction, ∈ 0,1 ;
Leader Utility Function
Unique Solution: security and safety; MMS (Multimedia Messaging Service); video calls; video sharing; gaming; uploading and downloading. Each kind of data requirement has its own utility function, due to the different demands/conditions required for each behavior with respect to transmit power and PDR. Initially, D2D users sort themselves into one of the behavior groups (as in Fig. 3 ), according to the type of data requirement and practical applications the user requires. Once D2D users have assigned themselves to a behavior group, they cannot change behaviors during the finite stages of the repeated game, as their actions are deterministic and thus the D2D users have pure strategies. For a fair comparison between the different behaviors, we ensure that there is an even number of D2D transmitters (from the D2D pairs) in each of the behavior groups. Since we consider only one of the D2D users within the pair transmitting, hence the receiver from the D2D pair can either lie within the same behavior group or another.
A. Leader Utility Function Analysis
The leader aims to obtain optimal satisfaction within the cell with respect to the D2D users, by maximizing its utility function with respect to satisfaction. The action set of the leader is a finite set, where it measures its satisfaction as a percentage, i.e. x ∈ (0, 1]. Satisfaction of 0% means that the BS has no satisfaction within the cell, and satisfaction of 100% means that the BS has total satisfaction within the cell. We have disregarded the case where the BS has no satisfaction, i.e. 0%, as in a real world scenario the BS would have some general information about the cell.
The utility function for the leader of the dynamic Stackelberg UIL repeated game is an arbitrary quadratic function, chosen for its particular and simple properties. The leader's utility function is a function of satisfaction (x) and average measured performance of the followers (i.e. average transmit power,p), U BS (x,p). The leader reacts to the average measured performance of the followers by updating its satisfaction with the cell accordingly. The utility function for the leader (BS) is as follows,
where α is the average measured performance of all the followers; p i(t−1) is the followers transmit power from the previous time slot; t is the iteration/time step of each stage in the proposed game, t ∈ [0, T ]; κ c is a positive scalar, κ c > 0;
x is the satisfaction of the leader. At the end of each iteration in the proposed game the leader maximizes its utility function (7) , with respect to the leader's satisfaction, to find the best satisfaction for the BS, as given by,
subject to x ∈ (0, 1].
B. Followers Utility Function Analysis
The followers play a non-cooperative power control game taking into account the leader's satisfaction price. The followers aim to minimize their transmit power while reducing interference, resulting in a power efficient network. The action set implemented for the followers is a finite set and is bounded by a minimum transmit power and maximum transmit power, p min ≤ p i ≤ p max . The followers further consider QoE and initially select a behavior which best suits their data requirements and practical applications. The three types of data requirements considered in our proposed game, are assigned different utility functions. Sections IV-B1, IV-B2, and IV-B3, introduce the three types of data requirements, by explaining their practical applications and corresponding utility functions.
1) Low Data Requirement Utility Function: D2D users who select low data requirement as their behavior, may perform one of the following practical applications: local voice call 1 ; SMS; local security and safety communications 2 [5] , [31] . The utility function for D2D users with low data requirement behavior, has been taken from [36] , U F L,i (x, p i ). This utility function is an SINR-balancing function and is modified to include the cost function charged to the followers. This type of utility function was selected for this behavior as it gives improved emphasis on transmit power and less emphasis on PDR, while still maintaining minimum target PDR. The practical application for this behavior requires low transmit power and quality compared to the other two types of behaviors, as the information being transmitted is much simpler. Hence, the utility function for low data requirement is defined as follows,
where p i is transmit power for the i-th D2D user at time t; γ d is target SINR for D2D users, which is set by target PDR; γ di,k is SINR for the i-th D2D user using the k-th subchannel, at time t; C(x, p i ) is the cost function which is analyzed in Section IV-C. At the end of each iteration in the proposed game, the follower's utility function (8) is maximized, to find optimal transmit power and PDR for all users with this type of behavior,
2) Medium Data Requirement Utility Function: D2D users whose behavior type is medium data requirement, may be performing one of the following practical applications: MMS; video calling; video sharing; gaming [5] , [31] . The utility function for medium data requirement is taken from [36] , where the utility function was originally a cost function. By taking the negative of the cost function from [36] , we transform it into a utility function, U F M,i (x, p i ), and include the cost function charged to the followers. We have assigned the following utility function to this behavior, as it gives approximately equal emphasis to transmit power and PDR. The practical application for this behavior requires complex communication, which means a slightly higher demand for transmit power, as opposed to the low data requirement behavior, to ensure good signal quality at the receiver without larger latency periods. The utility function for medium data requirement for any player, is given by,
where p i is transmit power for the i-th D2D user at time t; γ di,k is SINR for the i-th D2D user using the k-th subchannel, at time t; b i > 0 and c i > 0 are positive scalars; C(x, p i ) is the cost function, which is analyzed in Section IV-C. At the end of each iteration in the proposed game, the follower's utility function (9) is maximized, to find optimal transmit power and PDR for all users with medium data requirement behavior,
3) High Data Requirement Utility Function: High data requirement behavior for D2D users, may be performing one of the following practical applications: uploading; downloading [5] , [31] . The utility function for high data requirement is taken from [29] , where the utility function is a function of transmit power and PDR, U F H,i (x, p i ). We modify the utility function from [29] to include cost function. This utility function has been assigned to this behavior as it gives larger emphasis on PDR and less emphasis on transmit power. Users implementing this behavior would require significantly higher transmit power than the other two behaviors, due to, e.g., uploading and downloading of large content, and general higher throughput requirements. Due to the greater emphasis on higher PDR, this means that signal quality is ensured, communication reliability is guaranteed, and content is fully uploaded/downloaded in a reasonable timeframe without any significant latency concerns. The utility function for the high data requirement behavior, is given by,
where p i is transmit power for the i-th D2D user at time t; pdr i is PDR for the i-th D2D user at time t; d i > 0 is a positive scalar; w i > 0 and v i > 0 are positive exponents; C(x, p i ) is the cost function, which is analyzed in Section IV-C. At the end of each iteration in the proposed game, the follower's utility function (10) is maximized, to find optimal transmit power and PDR for all users with this type of behavior, maximize pi U F H,i (x, p i ) ∀i ∈ N subject to [p min , p max ]mW.
C. Followers Cost Function
The three utility functions for the followers, (8), (9), (10), are assigned a cost function. The aim of the cost function is to charge the followers for using the dedicated spectrum. The cost function we have created for the followers considers both the leader's satisfaction and the individual follower's transmit power. The cost function is given by,
Equation (11) logarithmically combines the leader's satisfaction x and the follower's individual transmit power p i . As a result, the followers utility functions will decrease with increasing cost. 1) The leader first achieves a unique Nash Equilibrium:
for all x.
2) The followers then achieve a unique Nash Equilibrium thereafter:
for all p i ∈ p, for all x and for all i ∈ N 2 Remark 1. Once the leader achieves a unique Nash Equilibrium, the followers will then achieve a unique Nash Equilibrium thereafter, resulting in a Stackelberg Equilibrium. Proposition 1. The Stackelberg Equilibrium, i.e., the best response for the leader and all the followers, exists over all stages of the game. Furthermore it is sub-game perfect as it is independent of the game history (previous stages).
From Definition 1 we prove that there exists a Stackelberg Equilibrium for the proposed game, across all players, in the following two proofs.
Proof: To prove that the leader has a unique Nash Equilibrium, we have to test if its utility function (7), is strictly continuous and concave. To show strict continuity, this can be done by solving the first order derivative condition, ∂U BS ∂x = 0,
From (12) we can see that (7) is a continuous function within (x min , x max ]. We are also able to solve for a unique solution for the leader's satisfaction (13) , which is always maximum.
We input x into the follower's utility functions, which is a unique solution for x. Next, to show that the utility function (7) is strictly concave, we solve the second order derivative condition,
Equation (14) proves that the leader's utility function (7) is strictly concave, due to α > 0.
Proof: More particularly we prove that the three utility functions for the followers (8), (9), (10) have a unique Nash Equilibrium. To determine if the functions are strictly continuous, we must solve the first order derivative condition,
where
(iii) High Data Requirement:
From (15), (16) and (17) we can see that the follower's utility functions are continuous within the range [p min , p max ].
If we substitute x for x from (13), each follower's utility function will have a unique solution for transmit power, p i , which maximizes their utility function. We take an average of all the player's unique solutions producing an average unique solution,p, which is in equilibrium and input to the leader's utility function (7) . Therefore, the Nash Equilibrium is a hierarchial equilibrium, as the leader first achieves a Nash Equilibrium and the followers achieve Nash Equilibrium thereafter. Next, to show that the followers utility functions are strictly concave, we solve the second order derivative condition,
For (18) to satisfy the second order derivative condition, B > 0. We know that x and p i are always positive, thus the constants must satisfy the following conditions; ∆ > 0, q > 0, y > 0, and z > 0.
(ii) Medium Data Requirement:
where 2c i γ 2 i p 2 i > 0 and B > 0 to satisfy the second order derivative condition. We know that x, p i , and γ i are always positive, thus the constants must satisfy the following conditions; c i > 0, ∆ > 0, q > 0, y > 0, and z > 0. (iii) High Data Requirement:
We can split (20) into three sections, the first and third sections will always be negative, if the constants satisfy the following conditions; w i ≥ 1, ∆ > 0, q > 0, y > 0, and z > 0. We know that x, p i , γ i , and pdr i are always positive, hence, in order for the second part of (20) to satisfy the overall second order derivative condition of concavity, the constants must satisfy the following conditions; a < 0, b < 0, d i > 0, and v i > 0. In appendix A, we also prove that the follower's utility functions (8), (9), (10) are strictly concave and continuous with respect to the leader's satisfaction.
Remark 2. For the game to have a Pareto-efficient outcome, the leader must first converge to an optimal outcome, then the followers will converge to an Pareto-optimal outcome thereafter.
Remark 3. When the leader has maximized satisfaction, which includes knowledge of an efficient outcome from the followers, it is an optimal outcome for the leader that guarantees social welfare across all the followers.
Proposition 2. The game is Pareto-efficient as the leader's satisfaction is maximized and then all followers transmit powers are minimized, while achieving desired packet delivery ratio (PDR), in our dynamic Stackelberg repeated game.
Proof: A Pareto-efficient outcome is fully defined over the entire game, according to Algorithm 1. The leader first obtains an efficient outcome with respect to satisfaction, then the followers converge to a Pareto-efficient outcome with respect to transmit power and PDR, such that the game achieves an overall Pareto-optimal outcome. When the BS's satisfaction, x, is maximized the desired outcome in terms of satisfaction is achieved. Hence, each D2D transmitter, i, will minimize its transmit power with respect to all other transmitters, −i, until Algorithm 1 Dynamic Stackelberg User-in-the-Loop Repeated Game 1: Initialize all variables for the leader and followers. 2: At t = 0 the leader selects initial satisfaction, x = 0.001 from x = 0.001, . . . , 1. 3: At t = 0 followers select initial transmit power from power vector, p = 0, 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 23 dBm. 4: Sort D2D transmitters into one of the three behavior groups; 5: Play S-UIL Game: 6: loop for T times. 7: Calculate the leader's utility parameters; α =p (t−1) ; β = 2αx (t−1) ln(t); κ = κc ln(t); 8: Calculate leader's optimal satisfaction:
9: Assign the satisfaction price, x (t) , to each of the follower's utility; 10: Calculate γi and γ i for all cellular and D2D users; 11: Calculate the follower's utility for all the different behavior groups: 
13: Assign the measured performance of the D2D users,p (t) , to the leader's utility for the next time step; 14: end loop when t = T. 15: Output: x ,pi; no transmitter can further decrease its transmit power over T stages, and at the same time desired PDR is achieved for each D2D-pair follower.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we outline the simulation results of our proposed game from Algorithm 1. We compare the three levels of data quality with respect to transmit power and PDR. We also look at the effect of the leader's satisfaction price and the cost function, on D2D users. The results of our dynamic Stackelberg user-in-the-loop game are compared to three non-cooperative power control games. All simulation values are outlined in Table II .
A. Channel Model
The channel model has been taken from [33] , and modified to suit the UMTS standards [37] . The channel model is calculated based on a path loss model and small-scale fading (i.e. Rayleigh fading), as follows,
where A P L is the free space path loss channel attenuation; A SSF is the small-scale fading (i.e. Rayleigh fading) channel attenuation, calculated using jakes model; d 0 is the reference distance between users; d i,i is the distance between the i-th transmitter and the i -th receiver; ϕ is the path loss exponent.
B. Game Results
Algorithm 1 was implemented over, T = 100, stages and repeated, RP T = 400, times. We set a minimum target PDR of 0.9 for all levels of behavior, which results in a target SINR of 0.534, using the modulation scheme 16-QAM with 1/3 rate turbo code. In Fig. 4 , we look at the leader's satisfaction within the cell, with respect to whether the D2D users consider priority or not. Our dynamic Stackelberg user-in-the-loop (S-UIL) game maximizes the BS's measured performance and obtains optimum satisfaction. As the game evolves over the number of stages in the game, so does the satisfaction of the BS, which grows from 0.001 to 1 during 6 stages. The BS's satisfaction is evolving due to the average measured followers performance fed back to the leader after each iteration of the game. Fig. 4 shows that if the D2D users consider priority for each level of behavior, there is no effect on the leader's satisfaction, if D2D users were not to consider priority. Fig. 4 also shows fast convergence to an optimal satisfaction for the leader in our proposed game for both cases , i.e., 1. Fig. 5a , plots the average transmit power for the three types of behavior for all the followers in our dynamic S-UIL repeated game, without priority. The distances between D2D pairs are random and do not exceed the maximum D2D transmission range. It is evident that the proposed S-UIL game reduces transmit power on average more than the noncooperative power control (NPC) games. Table III outlines the average outcome of transmit power for the three levels of D2D user behavior for both the NPC games and S-UIL game. Also in Table III we include the average outcome of transmit power before and after the BS converges to an optimal outcome, for our proposed S-UIL game. As a result, once the BS converges to an optimal satisfaction, as in Fig. 4 , the followers then further reduce their transmit power to a Pareto-efficient outcome, while maintaining their PDR, and as a result guaranteeing social welfare across all D2D users. Due to the D2D users in our S-UIL game reducing their transmit power more than the NPC games, this means that the interference generated by D2D users is reduced significantly. Another benefit for reducing transmit power for D2D users allows for an increase in battery lifetime, hence creating a power efficient network. Fig. 5b , plots average PDR for the three levels of behavior for all followers in the dynamic S-UIL repeated game, without priority. Table IV outlines the average outcome of PDR for the NPC games and our proposed game. In Fig. 5b , we observe that our S-UIL game has different effects on PDR, depending on user behavior. High data requirement from the S-UIL game maximizes PDR more than the NPC games, where medium data requirement has little change in PDR when comparing the S-UIL game and the NPC game with medium data requirement. Low data requirement on the other hand has the lowest PDR out of all simulation results, however it is still above minimum target PDR. The different PDR outcomes for the three behaviors, illustrates the range of communication reliability and quality (above a minimum PDR target). High data requirement behavior maximizes PDR on average more than all other results, hence by maximizing reliability this allows uploading and downloading of content to be done in an efficient manner at high quality with little latency. Fig. 5c and Fig. 5d plot average transmit power and PDR for D2D users respectively, by taking into account different levels of priority for each behavior, i.e. low data requirement has a minimum target PDR of 0.9, medium data requirement has a minimum target PDR of 0.94, and high data requirement has a minimum target PDR of 0.98. Fig. 5c exhibits the same characteristics as Fig. 5a , with a slight decrease in average transmit power as the leader converges to an optimal satisfaction. Fig. 5d on the other hand shows the effects of PDR when different levels of priority is considered for each behavior group. In Fig. 5d , the high data requirement for the S-UIL game achieves its minimum target PDR of 0.98, except this is not the case for the NPC game with high data requirement. For all other behaviors, our proposed game and the NPC games also achieve their minimum target PDRs. Hence, our dynamic S-UIL repeated game achieves better communication reliability for all levels of behavior than the NPC games.
As the leader becomes more satisfied within the game and converges to its optimal satisfaction outcome, the D2D users also further reduce their transmit power, as in both Fig. 5a and Fig. 5c , while maintaining their PDR, as in Fig. 5b and Fig. 5d . Therefore, once the leader converges to optimal satisfaction, as in Fig. 4 , the social welfare is guaranteed across all D2D users.
VI. CONCLUSION
The number of users within cellular communications networks is ever increasing. Introducing D2D communications as an overlay to cellular networks can help reduce the load on the cellular network, while increasing network efficiency. In this paper, we proposed a dynamic Stackelberg repeated game with input from D2D users via a user-in-the-loop approach . We designed a dynamic Stackelberg-UIL repeated game, which jointly optimizes D2D user behavior and transmit power. The BS was assigned as the leader of the dynamic Stackelberg game whose strategy was to measure satisfaction with the D2D users within the cell, and the D2D users are the followers of the proposed game whose strategy is to minimize transmit power. The utility function for the leader and followers all have a unique Nash Equilibrium, and we proved that these utility functions are also strictly concave and continuous. Hence, the proposed game achieved a Stackelberg Equilibrium, which is sub-game perfect due to being independent of the game history. Simulation results have shown that as the BS converges to a an optimal satisfaction, the followers then converge to Paretoefficient transmit power and PDR. We compared our game to three NPC games which reflect the three different behaviors. Finally, we considered prioritized behavior, by setting different minimum PDR targets to different behaviors. From simulation results it is evident that our proposed game has a much better outcome than traditional NPC games, as players transmit power are further minimized, and PDR is also achieved and maximized.
APPENDIX A PROOF THE FOLLOWER'S UTILITY FUNCTION IS STRICTLY CONCAVE W.R.T. THE LEADER'S SATISFACTION
We prove that the follower's utility functions (8), (9), (10) are also strictly concave and continuous with respect to the leader's satisfaction. To show strict continuality, this is done by solving the first order derivative condition, ∂U F ∂x = 0, where represents all three utility functions for the followers. The cost charged to the followers is the same for all the follower utility functions.
Next to show the utility function (8), (9), (10) are also strictly concave, we solve the second order derivative condition, ∂ 2 U F ∂x 2 < 0,
To satisfy the second order derivative condition, the restrictions on the variables (q, x, y, p i , z) must satisfy their conditions in Section IV-B.
